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ABSTRACT
Earnings are an extensively used summary statistic of a firm’s financial perfor-
mance. Various corporate reporting scandals (such as Enron and Lernout &
Hauspie) have raised concerns regarding the credibility of this performance mea-
sure. This paper first discusses the empirical evidence on earnings management
practices by Belgian companies. This review indicates that Belgian companies
manage earnings to avoid declines in earnings or losses, to influence relations
with external financiers and to reduce taxes. Belgian companies quoted on the
Brussels  Stock  Exchange  also  report  significantly  less  income-decreasing
earnings management than their non-quoted counterparts, presumably to meet or
beat market expectations. Belgian earnings management studies further report
that  larger  boards  and  Big6  auditors  may  constrain  the  extent  of  income-
decreasing earnings management.
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Earnings are considered an important summary statistic of a firm’s
financial performance and are often used in firm valuation and con-
tracting (such as, for example in debt covenants and management com-
pensation contracts). Accounting and reporting scandals such as Enron
in the U.S. and Lernout & Hauspie in Belgium have fuelled a huge
debate concerning the credibility of earnings numbers, and have trig-
gered some proposals for change in the financial reporting process
(for example, the new Corporate Governance Law of August 2, 2002
in Belgium and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S.). The question of
how and why management opportunistically manages (or manipulates)
earnings1 and how this can be constrained is on top of many agendas.
Extensive research has been done on earnings management incentives
and constraints in Anglo-Saxon settings. Similar research in non-
Anglo-Saxon environments is rather scarce.
In this paper we provide an overview of the evidence on earnings
management practices in Belgium. In Section II we provide a discus-
sion on some major elements that affect the financial reporting process
in Belgium. We then describe various types of earnings management
techniques in Section III, together with evidence on techniques that are
used in Belgium. Section IV presents evidence on the incentives for
earnings management by Belgian companies, and Section V reviews
the evidence on constraints on earnings management in Belgium.
In Section VI we compare the Belgian evidence with evidence from
Anglo-Saxon countries. We conclude with a summary in Section 7.
II.ELEMENTS AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL REPORTING
PROCESS IN BELGIUM
Figure 1 provides an overview of some important elements of the
financial reporting process that affect a company’s accounting deci-
sions and hence the quality of its financial statements.
“Management”2 prepares an initial (unobserved) set of financial state-
ments3 and – in this context – makes accounting decisions and choices.
These are obviously influenced by the Belgian accounting standards
and company law. Belgian company law prescribes that financial state-
ments are to be prepared in accordance with Belgian GAAP (Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles), and the latter can be found in the
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FIGURE 1
Important factors influencing financial reporting and its qualityBelgian accounting law (i.e. the Accounting Law of July 17, 1975 and
Royal Decrees of October 8, 1976, and September 12, 1983).
The preliminary financial statements – as prepared by manage-
ment – are then reviewed and approved by the board of directors and
audited by an external auditor. Therefore the presence and quality of
the board of directors and the external auditor is likely to affect man-
agement’s accounting decisions. In particular, these two governance
mechanisms are intended to work as constraints on opportunistic
accounting decisions, as management will anticipate corrections if
some accounting choices are deemed unacceptable or in conflict with
GAAP.
The quality of a company’s board of directors is likely to be affected
by corporate governance regulations and recommendations. In Bel-
gium, the role of boards in the corporate reporting process has been
stressed in the late nineties with the issuance of recommendations for
good corporate governance by the Brussels Exchanges (i.e. Brusselse
Beurs), Banking and Finance Commission (i.e. De Commissie voor
het Bank en Financiewezen – CBF) and the Federation of Belgian
Companies (Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen – VBO) and, even
more recently, with the law on Corporate Governance of August 2,
2002. Belgian corporate governance reports include, amongst others,
recommendations regarding the size and the composition of the boards
and the establishment of various committees, such as an audit com-
mittee which overviews the financial reporting process. The Brussels
Exchanges recommend, for example, that boards should not exceed
12 members and that the majority of the board members be non-
executive  directors.  The  rationale  for  limiting  board  size  is  that
the effectiveness of boards reduces due to communication problems.
The presence of non-executives is expected to be beneficial because
they are able to give a more objective and independent opinion.
Belgian company law also prescribes that a member of the Belgian
Institute of Auditors (het Instituut der Bedrijfsrevisoren – IBR) per-
forms the external audit and provides an independent opinion on the
fairness of the financial statements. This opinion (audit report) is
added to the financial statements and made publicly available in order
to inform users about the credibility of the financial statements. Before
issuing an opinion, external auditors run a whole battery of tests to
determine whether there is reasonable assurance that the financial
statements are free of material errors and irregularities. The audit
activities should be performed according to the Generally Accepted
202Auditing Standards (GAAS or Controlenormen) issued by the Bel-
gian Institute of Auditors, and be consistent with the ethical and inde-
pendence standards prescribed in the Royal Decree of January 10,
1994 and the Corporate Governance Law of August 2, 2002.
Finally, the audited financial statements (and the audit report) are
released to the general public which will use this information for deci-
sion making purposes. The presence and/or importance of certain
stakeholder groups may therefore also affect management’s account-
ing decisions, and may work as incentives or constraints on earnings
management. For example, if a firm is planning a business expansion
and therefore needs additional financing it may either be more con-
servative  in  the  use  of  accounting  flexibilities  because  capital
providers will scrutinize the financial statements. On the other hand
management may have an incentive to use accounting flexibilities to
increase earnings and to impress future capital providers.
III.HOW DO BELGIAN FIRMS MANAGE EARNINGS?
There exist many techniques to influence the earnings number, but
most of them can be reduced to three major types (see also Table 1).
A first category consists of techniques based on exploiting the flexi-
bility allowed by the accounting principles (GAAP). This is called
“within-GAAP earnings management” in the accounting literature.
Examples of flexibilities in the accounting principles include the
choice between various inventory valuation and depreciation tech-
niques, decisions whether to record certain provisions and at what
amount, and the like. Note that GAAP allows for this kind of flexi-
bility in order to give firms the opportunity to prepare financial state-
ments that reflect economic reality as closely as possible. However,
firms can be tempted to abuse this flexibility to manage earnings.
Asecond category of earnings management techniques are clearly vio-
lating GAAP and are called therefore “without-GAAP earnings man-
agement”. This category involves mere management fraud and typi-
cally occurs in firms that have completely exploited the flexibility
inherent in the accounting principles to manage earnings. Early recog-
nition of revenue is a typical example. Note that it is not always
straightforward  to  distinguish  between  so-called  “within-GAAP”
(i.e. exploiting the flexibility within GAAP) and “without GAAP”
earnings management or fraud (i.e. violating GAAP). Finally, a third
203category of earnings management occurs more subtle through real
transactions that influence the earnings number. Examples include ear-
lier than necessary spending on maintenance or R&D when earnings
are  higher  than  expected  such  that  the  earnings  number  can  be
reduced; and the sale of assets below (above) book value such that
earnings can be reduced (inflated).
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TABLE 1
An overview of earnings management methods
Earnings management Specific method Example
type
Accounting decisions: Exploiting the available 
Within-GAAP EM flexibility within GAAP,
Examples:
 Choice and changes in  LIFO Vs FIFO
accounting principles inventory valuation
 Accelerated Vs Straight
Line depreciation
 Change in useful life of
asset
 Accruals estimation:  Recording / taking back 
Judgement in timing of provisions
the recording of and in
the value of some
accruals
Accounting decisions: Not applying / violating   Early recognition of 
Without-GAAP EM GAAP revenue (for example,
before goods are 
shipped)
Real transactions Managing earnings by  Timing of:
managing real transactions  Asset disposals 
(investment decision)




 Manage purchases if 
report inventory under 
LIFOBelgian studies on earnings management have focused on earnings
management through: 1) discretionary choices regarding inventory
valuation (Branson and De Rijcke (1999), 2) reporting of extraordi-
nary items (Branson and Loits (1997), 3) depreciation and working
capital accruals4 (see Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002);
Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002); Konings, Labro and Rood-
hooft (1998)), and 4) the complete set of accruals (Vander Bauwhede,
Willekens and Gaeremynck (2003)). Note that none of these studies
attempts to distinguish between within-GAAP and without-GAAP
earnings management. This is not surprising, as the border between
these two types of earnings management is often not clear for exter-
nal observers. Table 2 provides a summary of the Belgian findings as
to earnings management opportunities, incentives and constraints
together with a description of the sample and the earnings manage-
ment instruments that are investigated.
A. Earnings management through inventory valuation
Inventory valuation offers tremendous potential for earnings manage-
ment. Firms may influence reported earnings by effectively managing
inventory levels (the number of units in inventory) or by changing
inventory  valuation  methods  (FIFO,  LIFO  or  weighted  average).
Changing from FIFO to LIFO in periods of increasing prices, for exam-
ple, reduces earnings because the products that were sold most recently
(and are valued at higher prices) will appear in the “cost of goods sold”
entry of the income statement. The oldest (and cheapest goods) will
appear on the balance sheet under “inventory”. Also, if firms value
inventory according to LIFO in a period of increasing prices, and want
to increase earnings, they may decide to use or sell out their entire
inventory – and not purchase any new materials or goods – so that the
value of the “costs of goods sold” remains low. Still other methods to
manage inventory are, for example, recording non-existing inventory,
using inappropriate prices for valuation, not (or not correctly) applying
the-lower-of-cost-or-market principle, or exploiting the principle of
inventory write-downs. Inventory should be valued at historical cost.
However, if the market price is lower than the historical cost price,
firms should adopt the lower of the two (i.e. the lower-of-cost-or-
market principle) which reduces income. The market price is however
not entirely objective, so that firms have some room to fill this in








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yor damaged inventory should record a write-down on inventory, which
affects current year earnings in a negative way. If, in later years, this
write-down seems too exaggerated, the firm may (partly) reverse the
write-down. Since the determination of obsolete or damaged inventory
depends largely on judgement of the firm and its accountants, firms
may also exploit this principle to manage earnings in the direction that
is most beneficial to them.
Some of the above-mentioned approaches, such as change of inventory
valuation method5, seem rather innocent and can be classified as “within
GAAP” earnings management. Others, such as recording non-existing
inventory, can be classified as mere fraud (“without-GAAP” earnings
management). Still other methods, such as management of inventory
levels, are not the result of accounting decisions but of real transactions.
Branson and De Rijcke (1999) examined whether Belgian companies
exploit opportunities inherent in inventory valuation to manage earnings
and find evidence supporting the use of such practices in Belgium.
B. Earning management through extraordinary items
Under Belgian Accounting Law, losses on assets disposals, write-offs on
financial assets, and provisions for extraordinary risks and costs are to
be reported as extraordinary items. However, management has a lot of
reporting discretion regarding these items, both in terms of “timing” as
well as “valuation”. Firms may, for example, decide to sell some of their
assets – below book value – in good years, in order to reduce income by
recording a loss on asset disposals. Likewise, firms may strategically
record provisions in good years – as this reduces net income – and decide
to use them or take them back in bad years, in order to increase income.
Branson and Loits (1997) examined whether Belgian firms exploit these
possibilities to manage earnings and find evidence consistent with the use
of extraordinary items to avoid large declines or increases in net income.
C. Earnings management through accruals
Inventory-related accruals (for example, write-downs on inventory) and
extraordinary items are only some of the accruals that firms may use to
manage earnings. Other possibilities include: depreciation accruals and
working capital accruals (other than inventory-related accruals). Exam-
ples of the latter are: write-downs for bad debt and provisions for future
risks and costs (note that these are reported as operating income items
208in Belgium). Management of depreciation accruals is possible, through,
for example, choice and changes in depreciation methods. Accelerated
depreciation will result – at least in the first years of depreciation –
in smaller earnings than straight-line depreciation. Firms that want to
charge earnings as little as possible may also opt to extend the years of
useful life of the asset or decide to put a high residual value on the asset.
Sercu,  Vander  Bauwhede  and  Willekens  (2002)  and  Vander
Bauwhede and Willekens (2002) focused on earnings management
through “unexpected” depreciation and working capital accruals6, while
Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck (2003) extend this
approach by also including provisions and accruals related to extra-
ordinary items. The advantage of using unexpected accruals as a mea-
sure of earnings management is that they simultaneously capture the
effect of manipulations in all kinds of accruals and even of some real
transactions (such as for example loss on asset disposals). The draw-
back is however that they offer no clear idea of what individual accru-
als are used mostly as instruments for earnings management. Sercu,
Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002) provide evidence of the use
of accruals for earnings management purposes by a representative sam-
ple of non-listed Belgian firms of all sizes. They report that the absolute
value of the unexpected portion of the accruals is about five percent of
total assets. Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck (2003)
examine a matched sample of the largest listed and non-listed Belgian
firms. They report that the unexpected portion of the accruals for the
entire sample is about ten percent of total assets. They also report a diffe-
rence between listed and non-listed large firms as to the average level
of unexpected accruals: for listed firms the unexpected portion of the
accruals is 7.8 percent, whereas 12.2 percent for non-listed large firms.
IV.WHY DO BELGIAN FIRMS MANAGE EARNINGS?
Opportunity alone is not sufficient for earnings management to take
place, motive is also needed. In this section we provide an overview
of the Belgian evidence on earnings management incentives.
A. To smooth income
As decision making by various stakeholders is likely to be influenced
by the firm’s economic performance, firms – both listed and non-listed
209– have strong incentives to avoid earnings declines or losses, as these
are negative signals about performance. Similarly, firms have incen-
tives to reduce income in extremely good years (in years with large
profits and earnings increases) to create opportunities (“cookie-jar
reserves”) to increase income in bad years. The evidence presented
in Branson and Loits (1997), Branson and De Rijcke (1999) and
Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck (2003) is all consistent
with the income smoothing hypothesis as an incentive for earnings
management in Belgian firms7.
Branson and Loits (1997) examined for a sample of 517 large
Belgian listed and non-listed companies whether there is an associa-
tion between a decline in operating income or a negative operating
income figure and the presence of positive extraordinary items in the
income statement. Similarly they investigate the association between
increases in or positive operating income and the presence of nega-
tive extraordinary  items  in  the  income  statement.  They  find  as
expected that large Belgian firms use their discretion over extraordi-
nary items to avoid declines (but not losses) in operating income. In
addition, they report that firms prefer to manage earnings through
extraordinary items that do not result from real transactions. That is,
they  prefer  managing  earnings  through,  for  example,  provisions
for exceptional risks and costs over earnings management through
recording losses from asset disposals.
Branson and De Rijcke (1999) studied a sample of 419 large and
of 450 small and medium-sized Belgian firms from 9 industries where
inventory is an important item. They hypothesize that firms report
declines (increases) in inventory levels when gross margins (exclu-
sive of “changes in inventory”) increased (decreased) or are positive
(negative). Similarly, they hypothesize that firms record inventory
write-downs (take  write-downs  back)  when  they  report  increases
(decreases) in or positive (negative) gross margins (exclusive of write-
downs). The evidence is consistent with these hypotheses. Further,
Branson and De Rijcke (1999) also report that the avoidance of losses
(but not earnings declines) is especially pronounced among small and
medium sized firms. Note that these firms are not subject to manda-
tory external auditing.
Vander  Bauwhede, Willekens  and  Gaeremynck  (2003)  test  the
income smoothing hypothesis for a sample of 31 listed Belgian com-
panies, matched on size and industry with an equally large sample of
non-listed companies, and find strong evidence that firms increase
210earnings in bad years and decrease earnings in good years. More speci-
fically, they report that the sign of the unexpected accruals are sig-
nificantly associated with the level of pre-managed earnings. That is,
when pre-managed earnings are smaller than last year’s earnings the
unexpected accruals are positive and vice versa.
B. To influence relations with some but not all stakeholders
Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002) examine for a large
sample of privately held Belgian companies (1302 firm-year observa-
tions)  whether  the  strength  of  a  firms’ relationships  with  various
stakeholder groups is associated with income-increasing or income-
decreasing behaviour8. The stakeholder groups that were examined are
creditors, suppliers and employees. They find that the level of bank
debt and trade credit, as well as an increase in external financing are
significantly associated with earnings management behaviour by pri-
vately held firms. More specifically, they report that firms that rely
more on bank debt and trade credit are characterized by less income-
decreasing  earnings  management. The  level  of  income-decreasing
earnings management is also lower in years before firms raise addi-
tional debt financing. This is consistent with the argument that firms
which are more dependent on external financing have more incentives
to report good financial performance than firms that are less depen-
dent on external financing. Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens
(2002) do not find that a firm’s relationship with its employees has an
impact on earnings management. Note that the latter finding is consis-
tent with Konings, Labro and Roodhooft (1998). This study investigates
whether trade union activity affects earnings management, based on a
matched sample (by industry and size) of 193 firms with trade union
activity and 193 firms without such activity. No evidence is found of
a relationship between unexpected accruals and trade union activity.
C. To minimize taxes
Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002) also examine whether
taxes play a role in the context of earnings management. In particular,
they investigate whether tax motivations affect income-increasing and
income-decreasing behaviour of their sample of large privately held
Belgian companies. They find that tax paying firms (in particular,
firms with no tax-loss carry-forwards) reduce earnings significantly
211more than firms that do not pay taxes (in particular, firms with tax-
loss carry-forwards). This finding is consistent with firms managing
earnings downwards for tax reasons.
D. To meet or beat stock market expectations
The environments in which listed and non-listed firms operate are dif-
ferent. Financial statements of listed firms are also scrutinized by
financial analysts and investors, and firms may suffer from stock price
declines if they do not meet market expectations. Listed firms may not
only have incentives to avoid earnings declines and losses, they also
have incentives to meet or beat market expectations in order to prevent
declines in stock price. Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck
(2003) examine whether there are differences in earnings management
behaviour between listed and non-listed firms of comparable size, and
hypothesize that listed firms have (even) more incentives to increase
earnings than privately held firms (of comparable size). They do not
find evidence supporting this hypothesis for the sub-sample of firms
that have positive income smoothing incentives. These are firms that
have pre-managed earnings below last year’s earnings figure. How-
ever, consistent with their hypothesis, they do find that listed firms
manage earnings less downwards than non-listed firms in the sub-
sample of firms that have negative income smoothing incentives, that
is firms that have pre-managed earnings above prior years’ earnings.
V.WHAT IS CONSTRAINING THE EXTENT OF EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT BY BELGIAN COMPANIES?
In Section II (and Figure 1) we discussed that the initial accounts pre-
pared by management are screened by a number of controls before
they are released to the public. Two important screening mechanisms
are the boards of directors and the external audit.
A. Boards
Although corporate reporting scandals often suggest otherwise, it is the
board of directors, and NOT the firm’s external auditor, that bears first
responsibility for the fairness of the financial statements9. In Belgium,
the role of boards in the corporate reporting process has been stressed
212since the late nineties with the issuance of recommendations for good
corporate  governance  by  the  Brussels  Exchanges  (i.e.  Brusselse
Beurs), Banking and Finance Commission (i.e. De Commissie voor
het Bank en Financiewezen – CBF) and the Federation of Belgian
Companies (Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen – VBO) and,
even more recently, with the new law on Corporate Governance of
August 2, 2002. However, evidence on the impact of board charac-
teristics on earnings management in Belgium is scarce since infor-
mation on board characteristics is not publicly available.
Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002) provide evidence
on the role of board size on earnings management, and found that
the level of income-decreasing earnings management decreases in
board size. This suggests that larger boards may restrict earnings man-
agement, and more specifically income-decreasing earnings man-
agement. This finding appears to contrast with concerns voiced by the
Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance regarding board size.
However, the sample in the study only included non-listed firms and
the mean (median) number of directors in the sample was rather
small, namely 3.89 (3). This is much lower than the cut-off of 12 set
forth in the corporate governance recommendations of the Brussels
Exchanges. With such small boards it is unlikely that an additional
board member would cause communication problems, but boards may
rather benefit from an additional member in terms of the expertise
brought in. An alternative explanation for the finding might also be
that, as boards grow larger, board members can no longer agree on
an earnings management (accounting) policy which satisfies all of
them.
B. External Auditors
External auditors only have secondary responsibility for the fairness
of the financial statements, but they play an important role in pro-
viding high quality information to “the general public”. Since all
large Belgian companies are required to have their financial state-
ments audited, it is almost impossible to investigate the direct effect
of an external audit on the level of earnings management. However,
prior studies investigated the audit effect indirectly by examining
whether earnings management differences can be detected between
firms audited by a large or a small auditor. Inspired by DeAngelo’s
(1981) theoretical arguments that the level of audit quality is positively
213related to audit firm size, various studies have tested whether the
level of earnings management is smaller for firms which are audited
by larger auditors as compared to smaller auditors. There is however
little evidence on the existence of quality differences between audi-
tors of different sizes in Belgium, in the sense that different levels of
earnings management would be observed in client firms. Sercu,
Vander Bauwhede and Willekens. (2003) and Vander Bauwhede and
Willekens (2002) do NOT find that audit firm size is related to
the level of earnings management by privately held Belgian compa-
nies in their individual accounts. Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and
Gaeremynck (2003) find some evidence that large (Big6 at the time)
auditors restrain the level of income-decreasing earnings manage-
ment in consolidated accounts of a sample of listed and large non-
listed companies. They do however NOT find such evidence for
income-increasing earnings management strategies. One explanation
for these findings is as follows. Both smaller and larger auditors
deliver the same level of audit quality in case consolidated earnings
are overstated and potentially negative consequences for stakehold-
ers are huge. However, when the potential negative impact of mate-
rial misstatements on stakeholders is smaller, that is when firms are
using income-decreasing strategies, smaller auditors become less
stringent in restraining earnings management while larger auditors
continue to be stringent.
VI.EVIDENCE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN BELGIUM
VERSUS ANGLO-SAXON ENVIRONMENTS
The  results  of  empirical  earnings  management  studies  based  on
Belgian company data differ to some extent from the results of Anglo-
Saxon, mainly American, studies. A first important difference is that
American studies mainly examined earnings management behaviour
in listed companies. This has at least two reasons: stock markets are
better developed in the U.S. and financial statement data are not pub-
licly available for non-listed companies. Belgian earnings manage-
ment research has, by contrast, focused mainly on samples of pri-
vately  held  companies.  Two  reasons,  again,  are  that  non-listed
companies comprise the majority of Belgian companies, and individ-
ual financial statements are publicly available for Belgian non-listed
companies. Asecond difference with Anglo-American research, which
214follows directly from the Belgian focus on non-listed companies, is
that incentives of and constraints on earnings management are stud-
ied in relation to corporate stakeholders. In American studies earnings
management incentives are often studied in relation to stock markets
(and hence shareholders) or from a contracting perspective (such as
management compensation and debt contracts). A third remarkable
difference between Anglo-Saxon and Belgian research is that there is
hardly evidence of quality differences between large and small audi-
tors in Belgian studies, while both Becker et al. (1998) and Francis
et al. (1999) report clear evidence of differences in the level of earn-
ings management of firms audited by Big6 versus non-Big6 auditors
in the U.S..
However, there are also similarities between Anglo-Saxon and
Belgian research findings. The evidence is similar regarding income
smoothing (see for example Young 1998 for the U.K.), avoidance of
earnings declines and losses (see Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and
Degeorge et al. (1999) for the U.S.), and income-increasing effects of
stock-market participation (see Penno and Simon (1986) and Cloyd et
al. (1996) for the U.S.).
VII.SUMMARY
In this paper we provide a discussion of the empirical evidence on
earnings management in Belgian companies. Thus, this paper only
includes what has been investigated and reported in research studies
and does not cover all existing earnings management practices in
Belgium. The evidence indicates that Belgian companies manage earn-
ings through inventory valuation, extraordinary items and other accru-
als. Earnings management incentives in Belgium include: income
smoothing and avoidance of earnings declines and/ or losses, influ-
encing relations with stakeholders such as creditors and suppliers,
obtaining additional external financing, reducing taxes, and to meet
stock market expectations (for listed firms). As to earnings management
constraints in Belgium, there is some evidence that firms with larger
boards and that hire a Big6 auditor report less income-decreasing earn-
ings management. Note that the latter evidence is only found for a sam-
ple of very large (listed and non-listed) companies, but not for a broad
sample of non-listed, smaller firms. Also, the impact of a Big6 auditor
does not seem to work in case firms manage earnings upwards.
215NOTES
1.That is, manages the earnings statistic to its own benefit while impairing the interests
of other stakeholders such as, for example, employees, investors, creditors and tax
authorities.
2.Note that in Belgium the board of directors has the responsibility to “prepare” finan-
cial statements (and an activity report to shareholders). Although boards have the final
responsibility for the companies’ activities and financial statements, they may dele-
gate the actual decision making to a management committee. Atwo-tier structure with
on the one hand a management committee, and on the other hand a board of directors
is allowed but not mandatory in Belgium. However, it is reasonable to state that the
“executives” – here called “management” – and not the board as such prepares an ini-
tial set of financial statements, that then goes for approval to the board.
3.Firms are obliged to prepare and publish financial statements in case of limited lia-
bility of the owners. The amount of detail in the financial information provided
depends on the size of the firm. If the firms meet two of the following criteria, total
assets >3125000 Euro, turnover > 6250000 Euro and the number of employees > 50,
it qualifies as a “large” firm and then the full version of the financial statements is to
be submitted. Companies appointing more than 100 employees always classify as
“large” firms.
4.Accruals are the difference between earnings and cash flows.  These include depre-
ciation and amortization, changes in non-cash working capital, provisions, write-
offs and write-downs. Some of these accruals are, according to the Belgian income
statement, reported as operating items (e.g. normal depreciation on tangible fixed
assets), others are reported as extraordinary items (e.g. write-offs on financial assets,
extraordinary write-offs and depreciation on intangible and tangible fixed assets,
provisions for exceptional risks and costs). Studies that examine the complete set of
accruals thus overlap in a certain sense with studies which restrict themselves to the
examination of one specific set of accruals, such as, for example, extraordinary
items.
5.The Accounting Law allows motivated changes in inventory valuation methods.
The existence of these changes have to be mentioned and motivated in the footnotes
to the financial statements, together with the estimated impact of these changes on the
capital, financial position and results of operations of the company (see article 16 of
the Royal Decree of October 8, 1976 as changed by the Royal Decree of Septem-
ber 12, 1983).
6.Unexpected or discretionary accruals are that portion of a firm’s accruals that cannot
be explained by the firm’s normal operating activities. Unexpected accruals have been
measured through various models in the accounting literature (see, for example, Jones
1991, DeAngelo 1986 and 1994).
7.Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2002) do not explicitly test the income
smoothing hypothesis, but run different tests for firms with income-increasing and
income-decreasing earnings management. The evidence presented in their study is
implicitly consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis.
8.As income smoothing is apparent in Belgian firms, Sercu, Vander Bauwhede
and Willekens (2002) make a distinction between income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management and run their tests accordingly on two sub-
samples.
9. At least, this is a very popular idea in Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the U.S..
Since business failures often trigger corporate reporting scandals, the firm itself will
not be able to pay damage awards to investors which take the firm (or its management)
to court. Investors then try to sue the firm’s auditors – who are believed to have “deep
pockets” – in attempt to recover part of their losses.
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